It’s about time for a renewed focus on the federal project

Mesle A. 

Though it is difficult and complex to establish a federal arrangement based on language and identity, many scholars in the field argue that one of the characteristics of federalism is its aspiration and purpose to generate and maintain both unity and diversity simultaneously.

A central issue in Ethiopian politics past and present is the struggle between regional and central forces. During the imperial era, the struggle was expressed through continuous disputes between the central king or Emperor and the regional lords and princes (Bahru Zewde1 1991). When the Marxist military junta came to power in 1974, the ethnically based movements replaced the lords and princes as regional forces. When the EPRDF took power in 1991, the ethnic liberation movements conquered the center and regional forces apparently defeated the central elite. This is the context in which the implementation of a federal system is carried out in Ethiopia today.

The first kingdom in the Abyssinian highlands was established in the 1st century A.D. and was located in Axum, at the northern state of Tigray. The building of the modern Ethiopian state, as we know it today, did not begin until the mid-19th century, after the instability and rivalling of the Zemana Mesafent (Era of the Princes) had ended. When Emperor Tewodros II came to power in 1855, he managed to limit the power of the regional princes and established a national army with modern arms. He ruled by the support of Tigrean princes but did not completely succeed in pacifying the regional forces and at his death in 1868, a new struggle about succession started. The rule of the succeeding Emperor Yohannes was characterized by “controlled regionalism” (Bahru Zewde 1991: 44) but also failure to establish unquestioned central authority. The process of state building did not spur off again until the reign of Menelik II (1889-1913). Menelik expanded his rule from the central highland regions to the south and east of the country and established the borders of Ethiopia that we find today, a country including more than eighty different ethnic groups. He defeated powerful traditional kingdoms, some of them had been not been under the rule of the central highlanders before, such as the Oromo, the Wolaita, the Sidama, the Gurage and the Kafa.

Should this expansion process be called “unification” or “colonization”? The so-called colonial paradigm within Ethiopian history, represented by the nationalist and radical left, claims that Ethiopia includes many independent nations that were conquered and occupied by various Abyssinian kingdoms. The so-called Ethiopianist paradigm, however, claims that the expansion to the periphery during the 19th century was primarily a process of inclusion and assimilation rather than of colonization. The expansion to the periphery was not a result of an Abyssinian desire to exploit and subjugate, but primarily an outcome of internal power struggles between Menelik and competing forces.

The expansion to the peripheries entailed a spread of the northern system of peasant-lord relationships to the newly incorporated areas. A fixed annual tribute was introduced and the power to administrate and collect taxes was given to soldiers from the north (neftenya) who had a prominent role in the conquest or local traditional elites (balabat). In some areas, primarily in the lowlands, the Emperor expropriated land and the peasants who previously owned soil there had to buy it back from the state. The introduction of these systems supports the colonial paradigm’s thesis that the Abyssinian expansion included exploitation and subjugation of southern peoples. The arrival of the Abyssinians led to violent conflicts in many areas and the newcomers applied brutal methods to pacify those who showed resistance (Marcus 1995). The local elite had to become assimilated to be accepted as administrators, which implied that they had to adopt the Amhara language, religion and culture. According to the Ethiopianist paradigm, the “amharisation” was a sign of inclusiveness. This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that the Amhara rulers had a derogatory attitude to the southerners, and saw them as primitive pagans without a culture of their own (Marcus 1995).

The struggle between central and regional forces has been the main theme throughout the history of Ethiopian state building. In the medieval and imperial ages, the struggle was between regional lords and the centrally based king or Emperor, while in the second half of the 20th century, it was between ethnically based liberation movements and central autocracies. Does the current federalization of Ethiopia offer a new and sustainable solution to the central- regional conflicts or are the old struggles just continuing in another shape? The federal system offers at least the legal and institutional framework for a reorganization of central-regional relations.

A new start

Federalism was introduced in Ethiopia in 1991 when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power and launched the idea of “self-determination for the nationalities”, up to and including secession, devolving political, administrative and economic power to ethnically defined regional states. The 1994 constitution assured that both the federal and the regional governments have their own legislative, judicial and executive power and the right to levy taxes and allocate budgets. The federal government with a bicameral parliament and a constitutional president was assigned the responsibility of national defense, foreign relations, and the setting of national standards for major policies. Regional governments, governed by the state president/chief executive and the state council and the woreda (district) councils, was empowered to establish its own administration and formulate and execute economic, social and political strategies and plans. The most comprehensive rights of the regions, however, were probably the powers to adopt their own constitution, and if certain conditions were fulfilled, to secede from the federation.

The Ethiopian government was restructured from a unitary state into a multiethnic federation through the subdivision of the national territory into nine ethnic-based regional states, the representation of these states in the national government, and the establishment of numerous ethnically defined local administration units. The transitional charter adopted in 1991 and the federal constitution that came into force in 1995 recognized the rights of self-administration, and even secession, among Ethiopia’s ethnic groups. The devolution of power to subnational units proved successful in avoiding the large-scale conflicts of the past between the central state and ethnic-based liberation movements.

The federalization of Ethiopia was introduced after a long period of attempted centralization in the country and was received with both hope and skepticism from the international community and political groupings within the country. Certain Western academics considered “ethnic federalism” as innovative, “giving room for thinking differently about ethnicity in the political evolution in Africa” (Chabal and Daloz 1999), while others saw it as a recipe for state disintegration (Ottaway 1994). But during ten years of federalization, the Ethiopian state has not disintegrated but achieved stability and economic growth.

When the EPRDF reoriented itself toward building a “developmental state,” ethnic self-rule has been given less emphasis, and the constitutional devolution of power has in many cases been overlooked in making way for centrally planned developmental policies, plans, and projects. The construction of large-scale hydropower dams and irrigated sugar plantations are some examples of the focus of the nation. On the other hand, the eviction of farmers from land given to investors in the regions and the associated corruption exemplify the conflicting aims of national development projects and evolution of the federal system. Top-down development edicts are undermining the autonomy of the regional states. Rather than facilitating national integration, centralized policy making is weakening the mechanisms for accommodating ethnic and political pluralism.

Ethiopia has received almost unanimous international approval for its ability to create economic growth during the past decade and EPRDF’s success of providing the Ethiopian people with what they need—inclusive and sustainable development. However that may ultimately challenge the whole rationale for maintaining a centralized decision making culture in the next course.

Most important of all, the economic growth that started under Meles has so far been maintained. This provides the crucial foundation for the support and legitimacy of the EPRDF’s dominant party rule. Ethiopia has seen unprecedented growth for the past decade and millions of its citizens have escaped poverty as a result. From any point of view, Ethiopia is a success story.

The Ethiopian federal system will continuously change, all according to the political circumstances in the country. Both internal and external political events might change its relations to the opposition forces and to the allies in the regional governments, which finally might alter the federal-regional relations. Due to this, the federalization of Ethiopia should be seen as a process in constant change, and not as a fixed system. Whether this process would lead to further centralization or more regional autonomy remains to be seen. A federation should be viewed as a dynamic process more than a permanent and unchanging system. It is reasonable to expect that the operation of the Ethiopian federation will develop and change in the future, dependent on political events and circumstances.