Let’s not read too much into the turbulences in Ethiopia

Mesle A.

EPRDF’s land slide victory in last year’s election baffles many observers of contemporary Ethiopia. Especially after this year’s protests in some areas in two of the nine states, it is increasingly seen to be used as anecdotal “proof” to discredit the result. That, however, is a fallacy.

The EPRDF has grown more confident in its revolutionary democratic development policy that centers on a developmental state. Although its ideological rigor and political will had already delivered modestly prior to 2005 an additional intervening variable has brought with it a new political incentive to deliver the fruits of development. This is the highly contested 3^rd national election in May 2005. Although the country has gone through two rounds of national elections in 1995 and 2000, the May 2005 election was in fact the first highly contested multi-party election ever held in the country. In fact, it appeared that this was not just a mere election but also a ‘vote of confidence’ over the political mandate of the EPRDF. The ethnic basis of EPRDF’s ideology was relentlessly attacked by the rightwing opposition parties particularly the strongest of all the opposition parties, CUD. CUD represented an ultra-nationalist resurgence that has been undermined by EPRDF’s institutionalization of ethnicity since 1991. CUD and many of the other opposition parties have also championed a neo-liberal development model by putting revolutionary democracy on trial; a reference to the then EPRDF’s failure to deliver a broad-based development. CUD’s electoral gains, though neutralized due to its overreach to take over the state via color revolution, sent shock waves to EPRDF in the post-election period. EPRDF has adopted intensive development as a guiding principle ever since.

The first political measure taken by the EPRDF was what it called ‘reclaiming protest votes’. It is no wonder that the EPRDF had in the early years of post-election focused on areas which were conspicuously favored the opposition. Thus, the country have seen intensification of ‘development activities’. By 2010 the popular mood towards the EPRDF has markedly changed in the opposition stronghold areas. It did not take long and much for the people to appreciate the delivery and for some even the promise of development. In the context of the simultaneous weakening of the opposition after the post-election crisis because of debilitating factional politics, many ordinary people appeared to have given up on the opposition and resorted to making the system work for their interest. Others caved in with a spirit of resignation.

The reasons for EPRDF’s electoral success are many. Opposition infighting in the run up to the elections; a huge resource and member gap between EPRDF and the opposition parties; the disorganization and splits of the opposition parties could well be cited as contributing factors. It is my contention that the way EPRDF has marshaled the resources for greater development delivery in post 2005 decade has certainly contributed to the political entrenchment of the EPRDF. This is preceded by an ideological shift from the preoccupation with the language federalism to development as a basis of political legitimacy and power. This shift is mainly a response to the signal the people clearly sent. In that sense EPRDF has accelerated its deliverance as part of ‘reclaiming protest votes’ as well as deeper ideological conviction. That has inspired the EPRDF towards development, Asian miracle style, which means development at a higher speed.

EPRDF has articulated a development policy which it calls revolutionary democracy, aka the developmental state. The architect of this development policy is the chairman of the party and the country’s late Prime Minister. Although cues to EPRDF’s conception of development can be found in its various policy documents two texts are key in understanding the cognitive framework of EPRDF’s Development policy. The first is a discussion paper entitled Revolutionary Democracy: Development Routes and Strategies (2000), and an extract from the Prime Minister’s unpublished PHD project entitled Dead Ends and New Beginnings (2006).

The fundamental assumption of EPRDF’s development policy is a non-liberal path to capitalist development. This is the case, so goes revolutionary democracy conception of development goes, in countries where the market is not well developed and/or where there are chronic market failures, liberalism and self-interest could not bring a broad-based and sustainable development. The application of neo-liberal economic policies could serve only the interests of rent-seeking individuals who are devoid of any sense of social justice. Where individuals presided over the liberal path to development in the western countries (the unintended trickle-down effect) it is a strong state imbued with a sense of mission that can midwife the transformation to capitalist development by mobilizing the relatively more available resources such as land and labor in the case of Ethiopia.

EPRDF is cognizant of the strong relations of dominance within the global economy but nevertheless recognizes a field of possibility that allows a constrained agency. Referring to the newly developed Asian countries EPRDF believes that it is possible to lift Ethiopia from a third world country with abject poverty to a middle income country through a carefully planned and state-led development path. This entails state mobilization of all sections of the society including nurturing, albeit a controlled, private sector. The existence of the controversial party-affiliated endowment organizations are justified in terms of the role they play in fixing market failures and filling the economic gap that cannot be covered by the state. A successful economic mobility within the global economy is also believed to be able to adapt a pragmatic approach to tap into the resources of International Financial Institutions as well as exploiting the emerging competing centers of global economy that is reminiscent of the cold war bi-polarity. By and large the idea of a constrained transformational agency dominates EPRDF’s economic thinking.

Although EPRDF has underwent an ideological transfiguration shortly before seizing state power in 1991 it still retains a leftist worldview while pursuing capitalist development. This belief in the new ‘holy alliance’ between a socialist world view and a capitalist economy is reinforced by the Chinese precedence. EPRDF’s allocation of the lion’s share of the national budget to the poverty sector is situated within this larger and deeper ideological context. The Asian miracle which EPRDF passionately refers to in justifying its development policy is another source of inspiration. So much so that not only the future glory but the current pain (high cost of living) is explained as the necessary evil (the cost of transition).

EPRDF also feels vindicated by the current financial crisis in developed countries as the ultimate ‘vice’ of the neo-liberal vision of the world. Responding to the drawbacks of neo-liberal development, alternatives emerged in the discourse of development. Most of these alternatives advocate for a greater role of the state in the economic process. The endorsement of the developmental state by renowned economists of global fame and influence such as Joseph Stieglitz has lent a new intellectual basis for EPRDF’s alternative model of development. In fact Stieglitz, the doctoral mentor of the Prime Minister, was repeatedly mentioned as ‘friend of our organization’. On his part, Stigltiz has made several visits to Ethiopia and has applauded the Ethiopian growth:

“It has been impressive to see Ethiopia’s growth being sustained for the last few years by double digits. Most of the rest of the east African Countries and other developing nations have also been doing well. What is striking about Ethiopia’s growth seemed the source of it. Some of the growth these developing countries registered over the last several years is a result of increase in commodity prices, particularly in the case of China. The success I Ethiopia is clearly far more than that. It has got to do with an increase in production output, diversification, and going into new areas. More notably, Ethiopia has one of the most egalitarian distributions of income in the world. In contrast, in much of the developing world, not only are the high levels of inequality, but also the level of the inequality have been increasingly very dramatically. There are a number of ways and means that Ethiopia and other African countries could do in order to help keep up their growth. One important aspect is an effective role of the state in the developmental processes of African countries.”

The country’s development surge appears to have captured the imagination of its citizens in ways that could not have been possible five years back. In this regard, it has to be said that no government policy has been successfully communicated to the public as has the EPRDF’s development program. Lately, a day scarcely passes without a seemingly endless stream of media advertisement, announcing fundraising activities for the development of every near and far small towns of this country. From one extreme end to the another, every backwoods town on the map seems to be engaged in raising fund for building its own public roads, schools, clinics, water and sanitation facilities etc. This is a notable departure from both the distant and recent past. Indeed, historically speaking, the issue of development was rarely raised among residents of remotely-located towns. If ever, it was invariably raised in the guise of supplications or pleas for government funding for the construction of an elementary school, a telephone line or a post office etc. In marked contrast, what these same town residents are presently pushing for is partnership with the government. A partnership, that is, where they themselves would shoulder a fair share of the responsibility for the development of their home towns. It is no wonder, then, that along with fundraising activities the media is flooded with unending series of public announcements of tradeshows and commercial bazaars emanating from one remote rural town after another. The whole country, it seems, is in competition with itself, determined to achieve greater development through self-initiated partnership with the government

The human development improvements noted above should not obscure the fact that present levels of services and development outcomes are still unacceptably low and that Ethiopia is below the Sub-Saharan average for several indicators of basic human welfare. Moreover, in Ethiopia’s success in the MDGs through expanded basic services, progress is not always even, disparities persist across gender, income groups, and Regions, and differential performance exists in different sectors. The fragility of the human development gains of recent years is also underscored by the macroeconomic environment facing Ethiopia following the unprecedented drought.

One of the main criticisms against the EPRDF is policy rigidity and the perception of development as a campaign. There has been little or no room for contestation of ideas from within, let alone a more inclusive debate nationwide. There are some encouraging signs, though. The emerging positive economic competition between regional states and the federal government is one positive sign that the economy might benefit from a new spirit of competitiveness than a wrong-headed consensus and policy rigidity.

Apart from the economic delivery in protest areas, the overall pattern, however, is towards scaling up delivery through the various development projects. EPRDF has shifted its core focus from accentuating diversity to development. Once it has seen the political dividends of delivery EPRDF has capped on development as an ideology of power. Unleashing the popular energy through competitive fund-raising and highly broadcasting volunteerism and partnership between the government and its people this ‘may well have permanently altered the traditional ground for legitimacy. Henceforth, any future government would have to be mindful of its development performance lest its tenure in office is shortened. This year’s protests has showed only that.

Hence, it’s only fair to see the turbulences in Ethiopia as requests for adjustments in the focus of the state and the violence as a result of the absence of civil demonstrations in Ethiopia’s state and civic culture. After all, the country has only adopted democracy two decades ago.